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Abstract. Appraisers routinely work at solving ill-structured valuation problems where
the normative performance criterion is an objective judgement of market value as of the
valuation date. This study, theoretically grounded in the lens model of perceptual theory,
investigates the effect of client feedback on appraisers’ perceptions of their role in the
loan underwriting process. It investigates the extent of cognitive departure from the
normative role toward perception of being a validator of pending sale prices. An
instrument is devised to measure environmental perception feedback, coercive feedback
and positive reinforcement of the normative performance criterion. Client feedback is
found to have a signiﬁcant effect on appraisers’ role perceptions and on appraisers’
perceptions of the of the lender-client’s performance criterion. Appraisers who receive a
great deal of environmental perception feedback and coercive feedback are more likely
to view themselves as price validators, whereas appraisers exposed to positive
reinforcement of the normative performance criterion are more likely view themselves
as providers of objective opinions of market value.
Introduction
Real estate appraisers are experts who are trained to apply the appraisal process in
the solution of property valuation problems. Appraisers play an important role in the
loan underwriting process, since loan-to-value ratios depend on appraisers’ opinions
of market value. Loan-to-value ratios are indicative of borrower equity, which ﬁgures
prominently in the probability of borrower default (Vandell, 1993). Guarantors of
mortgage pools and investors in mortgage pools are concerned about default because
higher than expected default rates increase guarantor cash outﬂows, which results in
unexpected prepayment of principal into mortgage pools. Federal and state regulators
are also concerned about default rates on portfolio loans because they can impact the
safety and soundness of the banking system. As this study will demonstrate, client
(lender) feedback can have an adverse effect on the perceived role of the appraiser
and, by implication, the objectivity of appraisers. Partiality and systematic bias in
appraisal implies imprecise loan-to-value ratios and erroneous default rate
assumptions.
Appraisers are trained in a normative appraisal process, which is a framework leading
the appraiser through each step of the valuation algorithm (Appraisal Institute, 1996).
When an appraisal is completed for the purpose of valuing real property as loan
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collateral, the appraiser’s assignment is to estimate market value, which ‘‘is an
objective value created by the collective patterns of the market,’’ (Appraisal Institute,
1996:20). For mortgage lending purposes in the United States, market value is
generally deﬁned as the most probable price (Appraisal Standards Board, 1997), which
implies a probability distribution of possible prices. Within this probability
distribution, market value can be thought of as the expected price, or central price
tendency, arising from repeat sales of the property under identical market conditions
at the time of valuation. In reality, repeat sales under such conditions do not occur.
The appraisal process, therefore, involves inference through analysis of price and
value-ascribable characteristics of comparable property sales (i.e., sales comparison).
Because of the wide applicability of sales comparison, the Appraisal Institute provides
a normative procedure to be employed when estimating value by this method. The
procedure includes searching for information pertaining to sales of similar properties,
veriﬁcation of the accuracy and applicability of the information, selection of relevant
units of comparison, comparison of the sold properties to the subject property,
adjusting the sold properties to the subject property in order to obtain an indicated
subject property sale price from each comparable property and ﬁnally reconciling the
various value indications into a subject property value estimate.
In many ways, the two aforementioned appraisal algorithms (the appraisal process
and the sales comparison procedure) correspond to the information-processing model
of human problem solving (Newell and Simon, 1972; and Simon, 1978). The
algorithms provide a standard, systematic model to employ when confronting a
valuation task environment and forming a problem space (a perception of the
problem).1 Training in the normative appraisal process model aids in acquiring the
expertise needed to identify the task-relevant aspects of a valuation assignment in
order to efﬁciently move from problem perception to problem solution. Notably,
training in application of the normative process to mortgage lending valuation
assignments includes recognition of market value, as deﬁned, as the problem-solving
goal.
Research has shown, however, that expert appraisers do not always follow the
appraisal process (Diaz, 1990a) or the sales comparison procedure (Diaz, 1990b),
especially when they are aware of the pending sale price (Gallimore and Wolverton,
1997), and that appraised values of residential properties are rarely lower than known
sale prices (Cho and Megbolugbe, 1996). Additionally, appraisers are subject to client
pressure to support or validate pending sale prices rather than provide objective expert
opinions of market value (Appraisal Institute, 1997; and Smolen and Hambleton,
1997), and have demonstrated a willingness to alter value conclusions without
justiﬁcation at the request of large clients (Kinnard, Lenk and Worzala, 1997). It has
been suggested, therefore, that real-world experience teaches appraisers that their true
problem-solving goal is to validate or support pending sale prices, and that perception
of the appraisal problem is colored by such experience-based learning (Ferguson,
1988; Fraser and Worzala, 1994; and Gallimore and Wolverton, 1997).
This study investigates the relationship between real-world experience and perception
of the appraisal problem by expert appraisers. Social judgement theory (Hammond,CLIENT FEEDBACK AND THE ROLE OF THE APPRAISER 417
Stewart, Brehmer and Steinmann, 1975), which stemmed from the lens model of
perceptual theory (Brunswik, 1956), provides the theoretical foundation for the
relationships between appraiser and client and the role of feedback in determining
goal perception, hence it is discussed ﬁrst. The study then proceeds by presenting
evidence of the existence of three forms of client feedback. Finally, it demonstrates
the impact of such feedback on residential and commercial appraisers’ perceptions of
their role as estimators of value for mortgage lending purposes.
Brunswik’s Lens Model of Perceptual Theory2
The lens model illustrates Brunswik’s (1956) perceptual theory, which says people do
not possess the direct information required to perceive objects in the environment.
Rather, perception is modeled as an indirect process whereby a set of proximal
(nearby) cues is used to make inferences about distal (distant), criterion objects. In
cases of judgement, where medical diagnosis is the typical example, the disease
corresponds to the distal, criterion object and the symptoms correspond to the
proximal cues (Brehmer, 1988).
According to the lens model, as illustrated in Exhibit 1, the perceptual system consists
of two subsystems—the task system and the cognitive system. The task system
represents a model of the environment, and the cognitive system represents a model
of the person attempting to achieve an accurate perception of that environment
(Doherty and Balzer, 1988). Cues are the ‘‘lens’’ through which a person perceives
the environment. For the perception to be completely accurate, it would be necessary
for there to exist an environmental model capable of predicting the distal criterion
with total accuracy; for the person to have a cognitive model that wholly corresponds
to the environmental model; and for the person to apply his or her model with total
consistency. Unless these conditions hold, a person’s achievement, expressed as the
correlation between a variable in the environment and a person’s judgements about
that variable, (Balzer, Doherty and O’Conner, 1989) will be less than perfect.
In order to capture the formulation of real estate valuation judgements, the appraisal
process requires a more complex lens model than that shown in Exhibit 1. For
example, valuation by sales comparison is actually a two-step process (Exhibit 2)
where comparable sale selection judgement is followed by a market value judgement
based on the comparable sale selections. In a real estate valuation context, the lens
model can be used to describe both a comparable sale selection model and a market
value estimation model. The cue set X 5 {xi u i 5 1t on} in Exhibit 2 represents
recently sold comparable properties, some relevant and some irrelevant. Within this
framework, assessment of performance in judgement about value (Vs vs Ve) depends
on the degree to which the ideal comparable sale choice (C1e, C2e and C3e)i s
knowable, the appraiser’s consistency in choosing comparable sales (C1s, C2s and
C3s), knowledge of optimal cue weights and weighing chosen sales in alignment with
an optimal model.
Difﬁculty of assessment of appraisal performance is compounded by the existence of
an unknowable performance criterion—true market value. When an unknowable418 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 1
Lens Model of Brunswik’s Perceptual Theory
performance criterion is combined with the complex valuation cognitive system, cue
weight possibilities expand and the application of appraisal judgement becomes
problematic. Therefore, appraiser achievement in an uncontrolled, real-world
judgement situation—as with most tasks in real-world settings—is expected to be
lower than appraiser achievement in a controlled, less-complex, laboratory or
classroom learning environment, leading to lower conﬁdence in the efﬁcacy of
judgements derived under real world circumstances.3
In addition to great complexity, real world cognitive processes are exposed to
extraneous sources of variation, or ‘‘noise.’’ Awareness of the pending sale price can
be a source of noise. Appraisal standards require appraisers to ‘‘consider and analyze
any current agreement of sale...if such information is available to the appraiser in the
normal course of business,’’ [Appraisal Standards Board, 1997, Standards Rule 1-5
(a)]. Therefore, appraisers are frequently aware of the pending sale price of the
property they are appraising.4 Appraisers have been shown to place excessive weight
on a known sale price in situations where the pending sale price for the subject
property is included in the cue set. For example, Gallimore and Wolverton (1997)
demonstrate that knowledge of the pending sale price, in instances where the pending
sale price is greater than market value, biases the selection of comparable sales toward
the higher, known price. In the lens model context, knowledge of the pending sale
price and other sources of extraneous variation inﬂates cognitive-system residuals,
thereby reducing the correlation between task-system and cognitive-system with a
corresponding erosion of appraiser performance.
Appraisers are also exposed to extraneous inﬂuences in the form of client pressure or
coercion. Roberts and Roberts (1991) suggest that client inﬂuence is the most frequent
cause of variation in appraised value conclusions. Several recent studies provide
evidence of such undercurrents. Smolen and Hambleton (1997) found that 79% ofCLIENT FEEDBACK AND THE ROLE OF THE APPRAISER 419
Exhibit 2
Lens Model of Valuation by Sales Comparison Process
appraisers knew of instances of clients pressuring appraisers to alter their value
estimates. The most prevalently mentioned sources of client pressure were mortgage
bankers and commercial banks. Kinnard, Lenk and Worzala (1997) determined that
client size was a signiﬁcant factor in appraisers’ decisions to revise their value
judgements at a client’s request in the absence of market information in support of
the requested revision. Additionally, a report by the General Accounting Ofﬁce dealing
with the impact of lender selection of Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
appraisers ‘‘examines charges that lender pressure on appraisers has drastically
increased since...1995,’’ (Appraisal Institute, 1997:1). Effective client pressure will
also tend to inﬂate cognitive system residuals and undermine appraiser performance.
In summary, the lens model of perceptual theory as shown in Exhibit 2 provides a
means of illustrating the task environment and cognitive system used in forming
judgements regarding real property market values. Additionally, unlike a controlled
laboratory or classroom experience, practicing appraisers are confronted with a
universe of real world cues that often contain extraneous, confounding and conﬂicting420 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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information or, in some cases, insufﬁcient information. Furthermore, outside
inﬂuences (principally appraisal clients) often pressure appraisers to alter, or to report
a conclusion that differs from, the judgement generated by their cognitive system.
Feedback and Appraiser Perception
Similar to other professions, formal appraisal training uses cases and well-structured
problems to teach the nature of the appraisal task environment. Appraisers learn about
the relevance and irrelevance of cues and achievement in solving well-structured
problems allowing appraisers to discover appropriate cue weights. Real world
experience, however, differs from a formal, classroom experience. Real world
problems tend to be ill-structured,5 hence it is difﬁcult to assess whether or not
appropriate algorithms and cue weights were employed in their solution. Additionally,
the value of the criterion variable is unknown and is usually expressed in terms of
probabilities.6 For appraisal experts, real world learning is the product of experience
layered onto formal training, and experience is at least partly comprised of feedback
from clients and other (review) appraisers.
Outcome feedback (OFB) provides information regarding the output of an appraiser’s
cognitive process—the value estimate and the report communicating the value
estimate to the client. Feedback provides information needed to compare the cognitive
system with the task (ideal) system and to make adjustments to the cognitive system
that bring the actual cue weights closer to the optimal cue weights (Doherty and
Balzer, 1988). Learning from OFB is, however, inefﬁcient and can often be
counterproductive (Hammond, Summers and Deane, 1973). Hence, Klayman (1988)
refers to learning from OFB as the ‘‘hard way,’’ listing three reasons this is so
including: (1) scarcity of feedback; (2) rarity of provision of highly informative
comparative information; and (3) the possibility that OFB may be systematically
distorted.7 He also points out that the difﬁculty of learning from OFB is compounded
by probabilistic environments (e.g., appraisal).
Klayman notes also, citing Brunswik (1956), that natural environments provide a great
deal of information redundancy and ‘‘given this redundancy...people may manage to
extract some information from feedback even if conditions are less than ideal,’’
(Klayman, 1988:116). Therefore, learning from OFB is expected to occur, albeit
inefﬁcient learning, and may override formal appraisal training (Svartdal, 1995).
It has been suggested that, although appraisers are formally trained to estimate market
value, experience teaches them that their true function is to support pending sale prices
(Ferguson, 1988; Fraser and Worzala, 1994; and Gallimore and Wolverton, 1997). As
noted earlier, the need to give weight to the pending sale price cue is communicated
to appraisers by the Appraisal Standards Board through the requirement that appraisers
consider and analyze the current sale. Little is said, however, about how the pending
sale is to be incorporated into the appraisal task system. OFB from clients often
communicates a lender’s perception of the appraisal goal as being to ‘‘support’’ or
‘‘validate’’ the sale price anticipated in the current sale, rather than the normative goalCLIENT FEEDBACK AND THE ROLE OF THE APPRAISER 421
of estimating market value learned through formal training. Lenders’ perceptions of
appraisal accuracy and the importance of the pending sale price cue, determined by
the lender’s goal orientation, are communicated to appraisers through various means
such as threatening removal from the lender’s approved list of appraisers, decreasing
the amount of work given to the appraiser and asking if the appraiser can ‘‘hit the
value’’ required to complete a given transaction (Smolen and Hambleton, 1997).
Design of the Study
The present study investigates the role OFB plays in determining (1) the appraiser’s
goal perception and (2) the appraiser’s perception of the lender’s achievement
criterion. A survey questionnaire was designed to reveal the role played by OFB and
additional personal information such as age, years of experience, education, appraisal
designations held, ﬁrm type and the like. One survey instrument and two perceptual
measures were included in the questionnaire to facilitate the investigation.
A ten-variable Client Feedback Instrument (CFI) was created to measure three OFB
constructs—environmental perception feedback (F1), coercive feedback (F2)8 and
positive reinforcement (F3). Each CFI variable is rated in a Likert response format9
ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always). Contents of the CFI instrument are as follows.10
In a situation where your client has ordered an appraisal for a loan to
facilitate a purchase, and your opinion of market value is too low to justify
the loan amount, what forms of client feedback would you expect? (Rate
from 1 to 7 the degree to which you would expect to experience each of
the following.)
F1: Environmental Perception Feedback
Client asks me if I am ‘‘comfortable’’ with the value
Client asks me to consider other comparable sales
F2: Coercive Feedback
Client pressures me to increase the appraised value
Client ‘‘mentions’’ the amount of work they send to me
Client threatens to send me less of their work
Client threatens removal from their appraiser list
Client removes me from their appraiser list
F3: Positive Reinforcement
Client does not contact me regarding the value
Client is apt to send me more of their work
Client thanks me for helping them control risk422 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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One perceptual measure was designed to assess appraisers’ perceptions of their role
in the lending process. Responses were in a Likert format. The appraiser role
perception measure (P1) stated:
From your perspective as an appraiser, rate the role of the appraiser in
today’s market for appraisal services. Rate from 1 (disagree) to 7 (agree)
the degree to which you agree with the following description of the role of
the appraiser.
When doing mortgage appraisal work, to validate the pending sale price.
The mean score on appraiser perceptions of their role in the lending process was 3.75
(s 5 2.08). A second perceptual measure (P2) was designed to assess the appraiser’s
perception of the lender’s appraisal achievement criterion—provision of an objective
opinion of market value or support the sale price. Responses were also in a Likert
format. Measure P2 stated:
With regard to conducting an appraisal for the purpose of a loan to facilitate
a purchase, are your clients more concerned with obtaining an objective
estimate of market value or with obtaining an appraisal that supports the
sale price, thereby enabling them to make the loan? Rate the typical lender
from 1 (concerned about objectivity) to 7 (concerned about supporting the
sale price).
The mean score on the measure of the appraiser’s goal perception was 4.45 (s 5
1.79).
A mean score greater than 4 (neutral) for P2 indicates that, on average, appraisers
view lenders as being more interested in obtaining appraisals that support the sale
price than in obtaining appraisals that provide an objective opinion of market value.
Conversely, a mean score of less than 4 (neutral) on P1 indicates that, on average,
appraisers somewhat disagree with the statement that their role is to validate the
pending sale price. Initial evidence suggests, therefore, that appraisers’ goal
perceptions differ from appraisers’ perceptions of the achievement criterion of lenders.
In the following section, responses to the CFI are used to determine the signiﬁcance
of environmental perception feedback, coercive feedback and positive reinforcement
on appraiser perception regarding the goal of the appraisal task and the lender’s
achievement criterion.
Data and Analysis
The survey was mailed to 1,200 appraisers, a proportional sample selected at random
from two sample frames. One sample frame consisted of the roster of members of
the Appraisal Institute, which contains 13,095 appraisers located throughout the U.S.
The other sample frame was the 79,112 name national appraisal registry. The sample
included 220 Appraisal Institute members drawn from their roster of members and
980 non-Appraisal Institute members drawn from the appraisal registry.11CLIENT FEEDBACK AND THE ROLE OF THE APPRAISER 423
Exhibit 3
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Personal Variables
Age 49.0 11.4 26 84
Years of appraisal experience 17.0 9.6 3 52
Gender 5 male 0.80 0.40 0 1
Race 5 white 0.94 0.24 0 1
Full-time appraiser 0.85 0.36 0 1
Mortgage appraisal in last 2 yrs. 0.89 0.32 0 1
Education
Completed high school 0.03 0.17 0 1
Some college 0.19 0.40 0 1
Associates degree 0.10 0.30 0 1
Bachelors degree 0.56 0.50 0 1
Masters degree 0.10 0.29 0 1
Doctorate 0.01 0.11 0 1
Appraisal Institute Membership
SRA 0.18 0.38 0 1
RM 0.01 0.11 0 1
SRPA 0.04 0.20 0 1
MAI 0.15 0.36 0 1
Type of State License or Certiﬁcation
Licensed 0.13 0.34 0 1
Certiﬁed residential 0.37 0.48 0 1
Certiﬁed general 0.50 0.50 0 1
Firm Type
Commercial bank 0.10 0.30 0 1
Insurance company 0.01 0.07 0 1
Appraisal ﬁrm 0.74 0.44 0 1
Real estate brokerage 0.08 0.28 0 1
Government agency 0.05 0.23 0 1
Other ﬁrm type 0.03 0.18 0 1
Note: The mean is the proportion of the sample responses for 0,1 dummy variables. Twenty-eight
percent of respondents were Appraisal Institute members.
Questionnaires were mailed to the sample in September of 1997, and the survey was
administered according to the Dillman (1978) ‘‘total design method.’’ Of the 1,200
questionnaires mailed, 14 were returned due to an incorrect address or the person no
longer being actively engaged in appraisal, leaving an effective sample size of 1,186.
There were 377 usable responses, which equates to a 31.8% response rate.12
Exhibit 3 contains descriptive data on the respondents. On average, they were 49
years of age and had 17 years of appraisal experience. Most were male (80%), white
(94%), employed full time in the appraisal business (85%) and had done an appraisal
for mortgage lending purposes within the past two years (89%).13 A majority of the
respondents had a bachelors degree (56%). Certiﬁed general appraisers were most424 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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prevalent (50%), followed by certiﬁed residential appraisers (37%). Licensed
appraisers made up the smallest proportion (13%). Twenty-eight percent of the
respondents were members of the Appraisal Institute, many of whom held more than
one Appraisal Institute designation. When Appraisal Institute designations are
considered individually, 18% were SRAs, 1% were RMs, 4% were SRPAs and 15%
were MAIs.14 A large majority of the respondents worked for traditional appraisal
ﬁrms (74%). The remainder consisted of commercial bank employees (10%),
associates of real estate brokerage ﬁrms (8%), government employees (5%), other
types of ﬁrms, including one accounting ﬁrm employee (5%) and insurance companies
(1%).
Client Feedback Instrument
Exhibit 4 presents mean scores on the ten CFI variables, which were reported on a 7
point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (sometimes) to 7 (always). The two most
prevalent forms of lender feedback in instances where the appraised value was too
low to facilitate a purchase were both environmental (F1). ‘‘Client asks me to consider
other comparable sales’’ had a mean score of 4.28, and ‘‘client asks me if I am
comfortable with the value’’ had a mean score of 3.88. The next most prevalent form
of lender feedback (in the F2 coercive feedback dimension) was ‘‘client pressures me
to increase the appraised value’’(mean 5 3.39). Three positive reinforcers were fourth,
ﬁfth and sixth most prevalent; followed by the remaining coercive feedback variables.
As Exhibit 4 shows, the CFI factored into three underlying constructs, as designed,
and each of the variables loaded most heavily on its appropriate dimension. The three-
dimensional CFI construct is also supported by the convention of excluding
dimensions with eigenvalues less than one. Eigenvalues for the three CFI constructs
were 3.74, 1.40 and 1.28, respectively; whereas the eigenvalue for the fourth, and ﬁrst
excluded, dimension was 0.881.15 The three included CFI dimensions accounted for
64.2% of the variance in the client feedback instrument. Standardized factor scores
were derived for each CFI construct: (F1) environmental perception feedback, (F2)
coercive feedback and (F3) positive reinforcement. Principal components factor
analysis with an orthogonal (VARIMAX) rotation was employed to eliminate
multicollinearity in the factor scores used to investigate the relationship between the
three feedback constructs and appraiser perception regarding the goal of the appraisal
task and the lender’s achievement criterion.
Modeling the Relationship between Feedback and Appraiser Perception
The ﬁrst model of the relationship between the three feedback constructs and appraiser
perception involves a simple correlation analysis. As shown in Exhibit 5,
environmental perception feedback (F1) and coercive feedback (F2) both show highly
signiﬁcant positive correlations with P2—the perception that lenders are more
interested in obtaining appraisals that support the sale price than in obtaining
appraisals that provide an objective opinion of market value. They are also positively
correlated with P1—the perception of the appraiser’s role being to validate the
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Exhibit 5
Correlation Between CFI Constructs and Perceptions
Variable P1 P2 F1 F2 F3
P1: Appraiser’s role is price validator 1.00
P2: Client’s concern about supporting sale price .421 1.00
F1: Environmental Perception Feedback .220 .226 1.00
F2: Coercive Feedback .139 .320 .000 1.00
F3: Positive Reinforcement 2.161 2.282 .000 .000 1.00
Note: Correlations in bold print are signiﬁcant at better than the .01 level, and the p-value for r(F2,
P1) is .013.
better than the .01 level. Conversely, positive reinforcement of provision of objective
opinions of value (F3) shows signiﬁcant negative correlations with both perceptions.
All of the correlation signs are consistent with OFB learning expectations.
Respondents were divided into commercial/investment and residential appraiser
subsets with appraisers who indicated spending 50% or more of their time on non-
residential appraisal assignments classiﬁed as ‘‘commercial appraisers’’ and the
remainder as ‘‘residential appraisers.’’ Residential appraisers were signiﬁcantly more
apt to view their role as being a price-validator (residential P1 mean 5 3.96 vs
commercial P1 mean 5 3.10, t-ratio 5 3.18). Likewise, they were more inclined to
perceive the client as being concerned about obtaining appraisals that support the
pending sale price (residential P2 mean 5 4.60 vs commercial P2 mean 5 4.00,
t-ratio 5 2.56).
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models reveal that all three forms of client
feedback are highly signiﬁcant in altering appraiser perception. As shown in Exhibit
6, both the P1 and P2 models are highly signiﬁcant for all respondents and for the
commercial appraiser and residential appraiser subsets. The t-scores and positive
coefﬁcients on F1 and F2 in the three P1 models indicate that appraisers who are
subjected to higher than average incidences of environmental perception feedback and
coercive feedback are signiﬁcantly more likely to perceive their role as being to
validate or support the sale price. Also, this feedback effect appears to be strongest
and most signiﬁcant for commercial appraisers. Additionally, incidences of
environmental perception feedback (F1) and coercive feedback (F2), as shown in the
three P2 models, have a signiﬁcant effects on appraisers’ perceptions of the client
achievement criterion being sale price validation. The scale of environmental
perception feedback on P2 is equivalent for commercial and residential appraisers,
but the coercive feedback effect is greater for commercial appraisers.
Regarding positive reinforcement of provision of objective value estimates, the
negative coefﬁcients on F3 in all of the models is consistent with expectations.
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perceptions for the residential subset, however. F3 is insigniﬁcant in altering the
appraiser’s role perception in the commercial appraiser subset, and it is only
moderately signiﬁcant in its effect on commercial appraisers’ perceptions regarding
their clients’ concerns.
Conclusion
Appraisers who report values lower than anticipated sale prices are exposed to client
feedback in at least the three forms modeled in the client feedback instrument—
feedback that reﬂects on the perception of the appraisal task environment, threatening
feedback intended to coerce appraisers into supporting a given sale price, and positive
feedback that reinforces the normative model learned in formal appraisal training.
These forms of client feedback have signiﬁcant effects on perception of the appraisal
task environment.
Appraiser perception of the client’s view of the appraiser’s role in the lending process
is skewed toward ‘‘concerned about obtaining an appraisal that supports the sale price’’
(P2, 5 4.45). Appraisers appear to be hearing a message from the lending 3
community indicating that lenders are more interested in closing loans than they are
in properly underwriting the loans they close. Furthermore, appraiser perceptions of
lenders shift signiﬁcantly farther toward concern about validating or supporting the
sale price in the presence of above average environmental perception feedback (F1)
and coercive feedback (F2). Although the typical commercial appraiser scores
signiﬁcantly lower on this scale, the magnitude of the commercial appraiser’s response
to F1 and F2 feedback is much greater than the residential appraiser’s response. These
larger responses may be due to commercial appraisers having more at stake, since
commercial appraisal assignment fees are usually much higher than residential fees.
Despite these perceptions of the lender achievement criterion, on average, appraisers
do not perceive their role as being to validate sale prices (P1, 5 3.75). However, 3
appraisers’ perceptions of their role changes signiﬁcantly when they are exposed to
above average levels of environmental perception feedback (F1) and coercive
feedback (F2). A one standard deviation increase in F1 above its mean is sufﬁcient
to raise mean P1 from 3.75 to 4.18, which is above ‘‘neutral.’’ When combined with
a one standard deviation increase in F2 above its mean, the mean P1 score increases
further to 4.46, which is signiﬁcantly above neutral (p-value 5 .001). Therefore, those
appraisers who are confronted with high levels of F1 and F2 feedback appear to
represent a different subpopulation of appraisers who have abandoned their normative
training and do perceive their role as supporting or validating the sale price [ . 4.0 3
(neutral)]. These effects are even greater for commercial appraisers, who score even
higher on the P1 scale when subjected to high levels of F1 and F2 feedback.
Conversely, positive reinforcement of providing objective opinions of market value
when the market value estimate is less than the sale price shifts appraiser self
perception of the appraiser’s role signiﬁcantly below neutral to a level that is more
aligned with normative training. This is especially true for residential appraisers who
react signiﬁcantly to positive reinforcement, aligning their perceptions with normativeCLIENT FEEDBACK AND THE ROLE OF THE APPRAISER 429
training as a consequence of positive reinforcement. It is not clear that positive
reinforcement has this effect on commercial appraisers, however.
Feedback is communicated to appraisers from lower levels of lending institution
management, by mortgage brokers, loan ofﬁcers and/or review appraisers. However,
appraisals are a part of the loan underwriting function, and we argue that at some
higher management level there are members of the lending community who are, or
should be, concerned about the role appraisers play. Even if concern about the
appraiser’s role doesn’t reside at higher levels of ﬁnancial institution management, it
has—at admittedly varying levels of enthusiasm—resided outside of the institutions
with regulators who are charged with protecting their safety and soundness.
Additionally, investors in and guarantors of mortgage pools are concerned about true
loan-to-value ratios because borrower equity ﬁgures prominently in default, which
impacts guarantor cash ﬂow and, hence, prepayment and investor yield on mortgage
backed security investments.
In light of these ﬁndings, if this issue is sufﬁciently important to the mortgage lending
and mortgage investing communities, ways must be devised to alter appraiser
perceptions regarding their role in the lending process. For residential appraisers, who
have little at stake in terms of the amount of the appraisal fee for any given
assignment, positive reinforcement of normative behavior appears to be effective.
However, this appears not to hold for commercial appraisers. Hence, investigation—
perhaps from the ﬁeld of experimental economics—into the incentives necessary to
alter commercial appraiser behavior may be useful. Such schemes could include
ﬁnancial rewards for excellence in objective valuation or audits with ﬁnancial penalties
for pending sale price validation behavior.
Notes
1 Sales comparison is not included in the appraisal process in all cases. It is generally employed
only in instances where it is logical and appropriate and a sufﬁcient amount of comparable sale
data exists. Additionally, the sales comparison algorithm is adapted to other valuation
approaches such as valuing land within the cost approach and estimating market rent within the
income approach.
2 See Brehmer (1988) for a fairly recent and up to date collection of essays and extensive
references dealing with this topic.
3 Similar, highly complex appraisal lens models can also be drawn to illustrate commercial and
investment property valuation judgement using market data on vacancy rates, expense ratios,
rents, lease terms, tenant improvement allowances and rates of return as cues. See, for example,
the apartment valuation experimental model in Diaz and Wolverton (1998).
4 One question in the questionnaire on which this study is based asked appraisers to rate on a
scale of 1 (never) to 7 (always) how often lenders make the pending purchase price available
to them when the appraisal is being done in conjunction with a loan to facilitate a purchase.
The mean response to this question was 5.92, indicating that there was a great deal of awareness
of the pending sale price in this particular set of circumstances.
5 Simon (1978) identiﬁed three features that differentiate ill-structured problems from well-
structured problems. Ill-structured problems have less deﬁnite goal attainment criteria, involve430 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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problem statements not containing all of the information required to solve the problem, and
offer no simple means for discovering all of the possible alternatives at each step in the problem
solution.
6 Market value, the criterion for appraisals done for mortgage lending purposes, is expressed as
the ‘‘most probable price a property should bring in a competitive and open market...’’(Appraisal
Standards Board, 1997:155).
7 Roberts and Roberts (1991) indicate that one form of client inﬂuence consists of withholding
or falsifying information.
8 Coercive feedback is important, not only due to previously cited evidence of its existence in
appraisal (Appraisal Institute, 1997; and Smolen and Hambleton, 1997), but also because this
form of negative feedback has been shown to result in a search for problem solving strategies
to improve perceived performance (Hogarth, McKenzie, Gibbs and Marquis, 1991).
9 Such a format, devised by psychologist Rensis Likert, permits several categories of response
along a scale such as the ‘‘never’’ to ‘‘always’’ scale used here.
10 The OFB construct labels, shown in italics, were not included in the questionnaire.
11 Appraisal Institute members are included in the Appraisal Registry. In order to keep the
correct proportions, care was taken to ensure that no Appraisal Institute members were included
in the sample drawn from the national registry. Appraisal Institute members constitute 16.6%
of the national roster of appraisers, and they constitute 18.3% of the sample. However, the
proportion of Appraisal Institute members in the national roster is actually higher than 16.6%
because appraisers licensed or certiﬁed in more than one state are double counted in the national
roster. The sample proportion of Appraisal Institute members is higher than 16.6% because it
allows for the double counting.
12 There were 107 Appraisal Institute member responses, which is a 48.6% response rate from
this subpopulation. The response rate for non-Appraisal Institute member appraisers (270
responses) was 27.6%.
13 Respondents who had not done an appraisal for mortgage purposes in the last two years were
excluded from the OFB analysis.
14 The American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers and the Society of Real Estate Appraisers
merged into the Appraisal Institute, and designations from both parent organizations survived
the merger. The SRA and SRPA designations were the residential and commercial property
appraisal designations, respectively, of the Society of Real Estate Appraisers. The RM and MAI
designations were the residential and commercial property appraisal designations, respectively,
of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers.
15 Readers not familiar with eigenvalues and the eigenvalue criterion for assessing factor analysis
dimensions are referred to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1992).
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